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January 1965

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
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8 January 1965

US-USSR: Moscow's initial reaction to the President's State of the Union message suggests that the Soviet leaders do not believe that the time is ripe for a bilateral summit meeting or for serious exchanges on fundamental issues.

The generally negative tone of the first authoritative comment in the Soviet press probably was dictated primarily by a desire to avoid furnishing ammunition for renewed Chinese Communist allegations of Soviet cooperation with American "imperialists." This is an especially sensitive issue in the period prior to the proposed 1 March session of the "editorial commission" to prepare for a new world Communist conference.

The Soviets apparently wish to discount prospects for an early heads-of-government meeting without completely closing the door to such contacts in the future. It is likely that they believe more time is needed to assess possible developments in NATO nuclear arrangements and US policy in Southeast Asia before responding to the President's suggestion regarding a visit by the Soviet leaders to the US.

Moreover, Brezhnev and Kosygin almost certainly intend to await the results of the President's visits to Western Europe and Latin America before taking up the question of Soviet-US summit contacts. In any event, Kosygin and other officials already have made commitments for several meetings with foreign statesmen which extend into mid-summer.

(continued)

Over the longer term, however, the Soviet leaders probably have a real interest in renewing direct contacts with the President. In view of their customary preoccupation with strict protocol and prestige, it is likely that the Soviets would first propose that the President visit the USSR in exchange for Khrushchev's trip to the US in 1959.

They would regard a presidential visit as a valuable manifestation of the authority and legitimacy of the new post-Khrushchev regime. [redacted]

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Panama: [President Robles is confident of his ability to avert major trouble on the anniversary of last January's riots, but the occasion is likely to be marked by terrorist incidents.]

[Serious disagreements among various Communist groups reduce the possibility of extensive violence on 9 January. The regular Communist Party is wary of activity likely to provoke government repression, but Cuban-backed subversives as well as supporters of defeated presidential candidate Arnulfo Arias seem determined to continue the current bombings and minor raids despite greatly increased security precautions.]

[Robles has significantly strengthened the National Guard, Panama's only uniformed force, and will use plainclothes agents to break up disturbances before involvement of the Guard becomes necessary. The government has made careful preparations to control processions to the graves of the Panamanians killed last January.]

[The US Embassy reported on 6 January that it expected much oratory unflattering to the US and some isolated attempts at violence, but considered the prospect for any large-scale violence "not great."]

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NOTES

France: [US Embassy officials in Paris believe, from remarks made to them by a high French Finance Ministry official, that France will convert into gold every dollar coming into its official reserves in 1965. Consequently, French gold purchases this year could amount to as much as \$800 or \$900 million, according to the embassy. On 7 January the Bank of France announced that it will convert \$150 million into gold within the next few days.]

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UK-USSR: [Prime Minister Wilson appears willing to visit Moscow without insisting that Premier Kosygin first come to London. While Wilson will try hard to get Kosygin to visit the UK, he is sufficiently anxious to meet the Soviet leaders that he will not be inclined to stick to the protocol of who owes whom a visit. The Foreign Office considers April the most likely time for a meeting, wherever its location.]

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Netherlands-MLF: [According to a Foreign Ministry official, the Dutch are concerned that failure to hold a North Atlantic Council meeting soon to discuss the MLF and related proposals may kill any further progress toward resolving NATO nuclear force problems. They believe no one in Europe will "fight" for the MLF and reason that a vacuum will be created if--because of US reluctance to clash with France--there is not a council meeting or some sort of multi-lateral meeting outside NATO. The outcome, in the Dutch view, will be UK domination of a series of bi-lateral discussions with nonnuclear powers in which nothing can really be decided, and the risk of a turn by these countries toward France for nuclear leadership.]

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West Germany - Portugal - Canada: [In spite of Canadian expressions of concern, West Germany apparently is going through with the resale to Portugal of 65 F-86 jets purchased earlier from a Canadian company. The Canadians have learned that the contract with Portugal was signed by the German Defense Ministry on 31 December and that the first 12 aircraft are to be delivered on 20 January. The Canadians are concerned because the Portugese evidently plan to use the aircraft in their African possessions, from which jets supplied by the US have been withdrawn.]

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